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The E-Books Price Fixing Litigation:  
Curious Outlier or Harbinger of Change  
in Antitrust Enforcement Policy? 
by EVAN D. BREWER* 
Note: After this paper was written, the case against Apple was 
tried to bench in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York.  On July 10, 2013, Judge Denise Cote found 
Apple had committed a per se Sherman Act violation by conspiring 
with the publishers to eliminate retail price competition and to raise 
e-book prices.†  The discussion here, based in part on the 
Government’s allegations against Apple in the complaint, echoes 
much of Judge Cote’s analysis. It remains unknown, however, why 
the government chose to pursue a civil action, and what its choice 
means for antitrust enforcement policy going forward. 
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I. Introduction 
In 2012 the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) brought suit against 
Apple and five major US publishing houses for conspiring to fix the 
price of e-books.1  The suit named five of the six largest publishers in 
the United States: HarperCollins, Hachette, Macmillan, Penguin, and 
Simon & Schuster.2 
The complaint contained many detailed factual allegations, 
including the sort of high-level executive collusion commonly seen in 
criminal price fixing cases.3  The charged conduct, horizontal price 
fixing, is per se illegal under the Sherman Act and among the 
“hardcore” violations that under Antitrust Division policy merit 
 
 1.  Complaint, United States v. Apple, et al., No. 12 CV 2826, 2012 WL 1193205 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 2. In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., 859 F. Supp. 2d 671, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
Random House, also one of the six largest publishers, was not named.  Id. at 1, n.1. 
 3. A recent example is the AU Optronics LCD price fixing litigation.  See 
Superseding Indictment, United States v. AU Optronics Corp., No. CR-09-0110, 2010 WL 
5641429 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2010). 
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criminal charges.4  Yet the government brought a civil case against 
Apple and the publishers.  Exactly why the Division chose to pursue 
the matter as a civil rather than criminal case may never be totally 
clear: the decision was made at a high level and the specific details of 
such decision making are not made available to the public.5  But 
analysis of the details of the Division’s case, viewed in light of current 
antitrust law, antitrust policy, and public perception of the players 
and the case, suggests a number of possible explanations for the 
choice of a civil action. 
The decision may reflect a shift in DOJ or Antitrust Division 
policy concerning the criminality of per se antitrust violations.  Or it 
may augur a change in department policy regarding discretion to file 
civil versus criminal suits depending on the strength of the case.  
Another possibility is a change in the DOJ’s opinion about the 
application of per se and rule of reason modes of analysis to 
horizontal price fixing.  Finally, and most likely, I believe, the 
decision could have been motivated by the particular facts of the case.  
The government may have judged the departure from policy justified 
by prudential reasons, including public perception of antitrust 
enforcement, questions about the deterrence efficacy of criminal 
sanctions, and concerns about over enforcement in dynamic, high-
tech sectors.  If this is correct, it is possible the decision simply be an 
aberration, a one-time departure from enforcement policy, or a 
harbinger of a more flexible enforcement policy.  
On the one hand, because there seem to have been no other 
indications of a broader shift, it seems likeliest this case is simply an 
outlier.  On the other, the facts of this case illustrate many good 
reasons for such a shift in policy.  Regardless, opacity in decision-
making endangers both deterrence efforts and public confidence in 
antitrust enforcement agencies.  Thus whether this is simply a one-off 
oddity or reflects a farther-reaching change, antitrust enforcement 
and those affected by it would all be well served by more 
transparency concerning antitrust prosecution decisions. 
This paper begins with a discussion of the background of the 
case.  Part I describes the rise of e-books over the past several years; 
Part II lays out the alleged conspiracy and the details behind the 
Agency Agreements signed between Apple and the defendant 
 
 4. See Donald I. Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in 
Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977). 
 5. Final decisions are made by the Assistant Attorney General in consultation with 
senior officials in the Antitrust Division following an extensive analytical process. Id. at 
408 n.21. 
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publishers; Part III the industry’s rapid shift from wholesale to agency 
e-book distribution.  In Part IV I discuss the deterrence rationale for 
criminal sanctions.  Part V details application of and recent 
developments in the antitrust modes of analysis, the per se rule and 
the rule of reason, and how the alleged conspiracy fits in.  It also 
discusses the government’s proposed definition of the relevant 
market.  Part VI examines strategic considerations that likely weighed 
on the Division’s decision to bring a civil case.  And Part VII puts it 
all together and reviews possible explanations.  The final section 
concludes. 
II. Background 
A.  The Rise of E-Books 
E-books have proven a disruptive force in the publishing 
industry.6  Production, distribution, and retailing costs are all lower 
for e-books than for their physical counterparts.  So, too, are e-book 
prices.  But how much lower?  An entire industry rides on the answer 
to this question, and the machinations of major companies in tech, 
retail, and publishing to provide one are at the heart of the 
government’s case.  
Though not directly involved in the case, Amazon is central to 
the dispute.  Through its online sales portal and Kindle e-reader, 
Amazon’s aggressive marketing and sales popularized reading on 
tablets and devices and in large part birthed the e-book industry.  
Amazon’s success hinged on its strategy of selling e-books for $9.99, 
particularly newly released and bestselling titles.7  This price is well 
below the price of corresponding hardcover editions, and often below 
the wholesale prices paid to the publishers.8  For Amazon, this sales 
model of razor-thin, or in some cases nonexistent, margins powered 
sales of Kindles and enabled them to capture the nascent e-book 
 
 6.  See Complaint at ¶ 2; Letter from Scott Turow: Grim News, THE AUTHORS 
GUILD BLOG (Mar. 9, 2012) (Authors Guild President Scott Turow describing impacts of 
e-books on the publishing industry), available at http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/ 
letter-from-scott-turow-grim-news/. 
 7. Complaint at ¶¶ 2–4. 
 8. Because it is easier, I refer to the transactions of e-books between the publishers, 
retailers and consumers as sales, though in reality, like many other electronic goods, e-
books are distributed via licenses and sub-licenses. Amazon licenses an e-book from the 
publisher, and subsequently licenses it to the end user who reads it on their Kindle, or 
other device. 
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market.  At the point Apple entered the market, nearly 90% of all e-
books were sold through Amazon.9 
Amazon’s success, however, was seen by publishers as a major, 
possibly existential threat.  Plummeting prices of e-books, they 
argued, would give rise to consumer expectations for similarly low 
prices of print books.10  Receding margins in the market for print 
books, and small margins for e-books would combine to imperil the 
industry.  If publishers were unable to recoup investments in book 
production, the industry would grind to a halt, output falling to a 
trickle of current day production.11  This $9.99 problem—falling prices 
and consumer expectations of falling prices—lies at the heart of the 
alleged conspiracy. 
Apple entered the scene in 2010 with its launch of the iPad and 
iBookstore.  The publishers saw Apple, an influential and disruptive 
player in many markets, as a potential ally with whom they might 
challenge Amazon’s influence over retail e-book prices.  Their 
interests were closely aligned: Although Apple was not overly 
concerned with the publishers’ $9.99 problem, it was uninterested in 
competing with Amazon on price.  Apple did (and does) not need to 
sell e-books at a loss to generate sales of its iPad, which is more 
computer than e-reader.  Apple makes money off its hardware,12 
whereas Amazon’s motivations are more complex.  Because it 
entered the e-book market in its infancy, Amazon was more 
interested in establishing the market for e-books than turning a profit.  
Even as the market has matured, Amazon continues to sell Kindles at 
a loss.13  Amazon’s real motivations lie in selling content, services, and 
 
 9. Turow, supra note 6. 
10. Brad Stone & Motoko Rich, With Rival E-Book Readers, It’s Amazon v. Apple, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at B1 (reporting that “publishers fear that Amazon has accustomed 
buyers to unreasonably low prices” and believe “if Kindle were to maintain its dominant 
position, it could force publishers to lower their wholesale prices.”). 
11. Publishers finance many if not most major titles in advance.  Because author 
profits from books come after publication, advance payments provide the necessary 
income smoothing for authors to undertake long writing projects by essentially borrowing 
against future expected income from the book.  See Jim Kukral, The New Business Model of 
Book Publishing, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-
kukral/ebook-publishing_b_1428197.html. 
12.  Apple’s gross profit margin on iPhones is an astounding 60%, and the principal 
reason Apple is the most valuable company in the world.  See Thomas J. Duesterberg, The 
Apple Business Model Is Good for U.S. Manufacturing, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-j-duesterberg/us-manufacturing-apple_b_1072089. 
html. 
13. Hayley Tsukayama, Amazon Loses $3 on Every Kindle Fire, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 
2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-11-18/business/35282380_1_kindle-fire-
nook-tablet-e-reader. 
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goods across many categories, and many of its ventures are designed 
to bring more users to the Amazon brand.14  Apple wanted to offer e-
books, but doing so at prices significantly higher than Amazon would 
serve them little good, and in fact might turn people off if they saw 
higher prices as Apple taking advantage of their customers. 
The agency model provided a solution to both Apple and the 
publishers’ problems.  Apple sought a way to avoid retail price 
competition with Amazon, and the publishers wanted to take away 
Amazon’s pricing power.  As it turned out, Apple proved a powerful 
ally, with whom the publishers collaborated to break Amazon’s 
stranglehold on the retail e-book market, and introduce competition 
and a sustainable business model to the industry.  Either that, or they 
illegally colluded to fix the price of, and restrain retail price 
competition in the market for, e-books.  
B.  The Alleged Conspiracy 
The collusion alleged in the Complaint is a hub-and-spoke 
conspiracy hatched by Apple and the publishers to solve a collective 
action problem.15  This collective action problem stemmed from the 
fact that the publishers faced monopsony, with Amazon as the only 
real buyer of e-books.16  With nowhere else to sell e-books, the 
publishers sold to Amazon, on Amazon’s terms.  Although they all 
wanted to end Amazon’s discounting, they could not do so without 
coordination.  Apple’s involvement proved instrumental in helping 
the publishers do just that.   
1.  Collective Action Problems 
To solve the $9.99 problem, the publishers could have insisted on 
minimum retail price agreements with Amazon.  Such arrangements 
would avoid antitrust issues because retail price maintenance 
scrutiny17 is limited to the sales of goods and does not extend to 
 
14. See, e.g., Mark W. Johnson, Amazon’s Smart Innovation Strategy, BUSINESSWEEK 
(Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/apr2010/id20100412 
_520351.htm (describing Amazon’s application of this business strategy across a number of 
markets). 
15.  Complaint at ¶¶ 46, 60–84. 
16. Amazon’s advantage as the popularizer of e-books should not be understated: it 
allowed them to capture nearly the entire market and made entry by others very difficult 
without competing on price, something few have been able to do in any market Amazon 
has entered.  
17. Minimum and maximum retail price restrictions, as vertical price fixing 
agreements, were per se violations of the Sherman Act until 2007, when the Supreme 
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licensing rights to intellectual property.18  However, the publishers 
faced a collective action problem that prevented this solution.  
In such a situation, what is best for the group is not best for the 
individual acting alone, and the optimal group outcome requires 
cooperation.19  While the publishers shared a desire for higher 
minimum prices, each individual publisher was deterred from acting 
unilaterally by the prospect that the others would not follow.  If one 
publisher renegotiated its contract with Amazon to require higher 
minimum retail prices, the others would have an incentive to not 
follow suit—to defect from the optimal group behavior.  By not 
following, publishers would see an increase in their respective shares 
of the market as consumers switched to their e-books on account of 
the price differential.  Even if most publishers ignored the profit 
potential of defection and followed the first mover, the more 
publishers switched, the greater the incentive to defect would be for 
each remaining publisher.20  As a result, the optimal outcome for the 
publishers, higher minimum retail prices, was unlikely to arise 
without coordination.  Or, according to the DOJ, unlawful collusion. 
2.  Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracy 
Coordinating through Apple to adopt agency distribution proved 
an effective way of solving the publishers’ collective action problem.  
But because this shift required coordination and resulted in higher 
prices, the DOJ alleges it amounted to price fixing.  According to the 
Complaint, the conspiracy to fix e-book prices grew out of private 
meetings among the publishers at various Manhattan restaurants,21 
 
Court held they should instead be subjected to the rule of reason.  Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007). 
18. United States v. Gen. Elec., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); LucasArts Entm’t. Co. v. 
Humongous Entm’t. Co., 870 F. Supp. 285, 289 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (“[T]he statutory right of 
intellectual property owners to forbid entirely sales by licensees necessarily includes the 
power to restrict the prices at which such licensees may sell licensed material.”).  See also 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark Lemley, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
ANTITRUST, §24.9 at 24-59 (explaining an implication of General Electric is that where 
“intellectual property owners license their rights by arrangements that contemplate 
sublicensing,” so “long as no goods are attached to the primary license, the licensor's 
maintenance of the sublicense price is generally lawful”). 
19.  See Russell Hardin, Collective Action As an Agreeable n-Prisoner’s Dilemma, 16 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, 472–81 (1971). 
20. Assuming the publishers are right that $9.99 improperly reflects the cost of an e-
book, the market likely would have adjusted prices upward over time, as a result of small 
changes, as publishers slowly adjusted their pricing arrangements with Amazon, seeking to 
increase prices without losing market share.  Or it would have resulted in exit from the 
market, as publishers could no longer profitably provide e-books at $9.99.  
21. Complaint at ¶¶ 39–45. 
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continued under the guise of joint venture discussions,22 and took final 
form with the help of Apple as go-between.23  The end result was a 
concerted shift from wholesale to agency distribution of e-books.  
Under the wholesale model, suppliers (publishers) sell products to 
retailers (Amazon, Apple, etc.), who then set retail prices.24  The 
agency model, by contrast, makes retailers agents of their suppliers.  
As agents they have no pricing power: they sell products at prices set 
by suppliers and keep a percentage of revenue as commission.  Under 
the wholesale model, Apple would face two undesirable options: 
price books higher than Amazon or accept low margins.25  Thus both 
the publishers and Apple stood to benefit from a move to agency 
distribution.  Apple would get a 30% cut and, standing on equal 
footing with Amazon, could then bank on its better tablet to drive up 
its market share.  And the publishers would solve their $9.99 problem 
by retaining sole pricing power, foreclosing Amazon’s destructive 
discounting.  
The collusion between the defendants took the form of a hub-
and-spoke conspiracy.  Coordination and agreement between 
publishers formed the rim, and the vertical Apple Agency 
Agreements they negotiated with Apple formed the spokes.  Apple’s 
involvement eliminated the collective action problem facing the 
competing publishers.  With Apple at the center, the publishers could 
both signal which agency terms they would accept and lock each 
other into the model, eliminating the risk of defection.26 
3.  Agency Agreement Terms: MFNs and Pricing Tiers 
Although the Agency Agreements signed between Apple and 
the publishers specifically governed only individual distribution 
relationships, they were designed to induce a shift to agency across 
the entire industry.  Two key features accomplished this goal: most-
favored-nation (“MFN”) clauses and formulaic pricing tiers for newly 
released and bestselling titles.  Together, these terms effectively 
 
22. Complaint at ¶¶ 46–49.  
23. Id. at ¶¶ 50–78. 
24. Again, because e-books are licensed to retailers for subsequent sub-license, this is 
not strictly true, as the publishers hypothetically could have determined the retail price. 
But because of collective action difficulties discussed above, in reality they were unable to 
do so.  
25. In other words, Apple faced retail price competition.  Whether the margins would 
have been sufficiently small (or negative) so as to foreclose entry into the e-book market is 
a factual question, and one that would be relevant under rule of reason analysis. 
26. Complaint at ¶ 61. 
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required the publishers to adopt agency distribution with not just 
Apple, but all their retailers, including Amazon.27 
The Agency Agreements’ MFN provisions prohibited publishers 
from pricing e-books at other retailers lower than at Apple’s 
iBookstore, regardless of whether other retailers were an agent of the 
publisher or operated under the wholesale model.  MFNs arguably 
restrict retail price competition, and may have the effect of causing 
price uniformity.28  But MFN clauses are not per se illegal, and may be 
reasonable restraints if, for example, they are instituted to correct 
market failures.29  MFNs can also help protect market entrants by 
shielding up-front investments from predatory pricing from 
competitors.30  
Pricing tiers in the Agency Agreements linked prices of newly-
released and best-selling e-books to their respective hardcover list 
prices, with ostensible maximum prices between $12.99 and $14.99.31  
In effect, however, these price points amounted to actual prices.  
Whereas before wholesale prices often exceeded Amazon’s preferred 
retail price of $9.99 (with Amazon taking the loss),32 now retailer-
agents would take a 30% commission on sales, meaning that in order 
for publishers to maintain even current profit margins, retail prices 
would have to rise, likely to the maximum price tiers.33 
C.  Agreements in Action – The Shift From Wholesaling to Agency 
In January, 2010, before the Agency Agreements came into 
effect, Apple launched the iPad and iBookstore.34  Apple’s announced 
e-book price points were well above Amazon’s.35  When asked why 
one would buy an e-book from the iBookstore for $14.99 when the 
 
27. Complaint at ¶ 76. 
28. See, e.g., Letter from Richard Blumenthal, Attorney-General of Connectitcut, to 
Bruce Sewell, Apple’s General Counsel (July 29, 2010), available at http://www.ct. 
gov/ag/lib/ag/consumers/appleltr080210.pdf. 
29. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, 51 U.S. at 877, 879.  
30. Id. at 913. 
31. Id. at ¶ 75. 
32. Amazon Pulls Macmillan Titles in First E-book Skirmish, LATIMES.COM (Jan. 30, 
2010), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/jacketcopy/2010/01/amazon-pulls-macmillan-titles-
in-first-ebook-skirmish.html. 
33. A book which previously carried a wholesale price of $12 under the agency model 
would need to retail for over $17.14 for publishers to receive the same revenue (70% * 
$17.14 = $12). 
34. Brad Stone, With Its Tablet, Apple Blurs Line Between Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
2010, at A1. 
35. Id. 
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same title was sold for $9.99 on Amazon, Steve Jobs responded: “that 
won’t be the case . . . the prices will be the same.”36  For Jobs to be 
right about uniform prices, either prices on the iBookstore would 
have to end up below what he announced, or prices across the market 
would have to rise.  In either event, Apple would be insulated: 
nowhere would there be lower prices, and they would always receive 
a 30% cut.  But the new Agency Agreements and Apple’s place at the 
hub of the conspiracy ensured prices would go up, not down. 
While the agreements insulated Apple from risk, they left 
publishers even more exposed.  The Agency Agreements effectively 
raised the stakes of not acting in concert.  If only some publishers 
signed Agency Agreements with Apple, not only would their $9.99 
problem remain, but as Apple gained a larger share of the market, 
those who had signed up would see their margins decline even more 
dramatically.  They would be obligated to price books on the 
iBookstore no higher than offered elsewhere, but would receive less 
per book: 70% of retail rather than wholesale prices.  Before, 
Amazon took the discounting loss; now, on sales through the 
iBookstore, the publishers would take the hit, and the loss would be 
greater.  
If all the publishers signed Agency Agreements with Apple, the 
MFN clauses would provide incentive to adopt the same agency 
model with Amazon and other retailers.  If not, they would all face 
declining margin problems as Apple’s market share increased.  But 
the same collective action problem remained, as did the risk of 
defection.  With these increased stakes, the publishers badly needed a 
way to coordinate and police defection.  According to the DOJ, 
Apple proved an able constable, providing assurances the other 
parties would all sign the same Agency Agreements and thus all face 
the same risks.37  Apparently high-level Apple executives passed 
information between publishers signaling commitment to the plan.38  
And it worked: The publishers signed Agency Agreements with 
Apple and all subsequently negotiated agency agreements with their 
other e-book retailers, including Amazon.39  In the end it took only 
four months for most of the publishing industry to jettison the 
 
36. Walt Mossberg, All Things Digital, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2010), http://m.wsj. 
net/video/20100128/012810atdmossy/012810atdmossy_320k.mp4. In the same clip Jobs can 
be overheard remarking that “Publishers are actually withholding their books from 
Amazon, because they’re not happy with it.” 
37. Complaint at ¶ 69. 
38. Id. at ¶¶ 70–74. 
39. Id. at ¶¶ 74–75, 79. 
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wholesale model in use for over 100 years in favor of the agency 
model.40 
III.  Discussion 
The Antitrust Division chooses to pursue criminal and civil 
enforcement by asking whether the investigated conduct constitutes a 
“hardcore” violation of antitrust laws.  Such conduct, which includes 
price fixing, market division, and bid rigging, is typically illegal per se 
under the Sherman Act, and it alone merits criminal prosecution.41  
The strength of the government’s evidence affects only whether a 
case is brought, not which type: if the conduct merits criminal 
prosecution, the government files a criminal case; otherwise, 
enforcement is civil.42  The Division will not file a civil case against 
defendants engaged in “hardcore” conduct such as price fixing simply 
because it cannot meet the criminal burden of proof.43  If the DOJ 
does not believe it can win a case, it does not bring it.44 
Despite this, against Apple and the publishers the DOJ alleged a 
horizontal price fixing conspiracy—the paradigmatic criminal case—
in a civil action.  The decision to bring a civil case in these 
circumstances runs directly contrary to Division policy and practice.  
Several key legal and strategic factors undoubtedly influenced 
DOJ decision-makers, and shed some light on how the Division may 
view the case and why it chose to bring a civil action.  First, there are 
significant questions about the link between deterrence and criminal 
sanctions, and reason to believe that criminal penalties may not deter 
 
40. Complaint at ¶ 79. 
41. See Antitrust Division Manual, Standards for Determining Whether to Proceed by 
Civil or Criminal Investigation (Nov. 2012), at page III-12, available at http://www.justice. 
gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/chapter3.pdf; Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney 
General, Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Criminal Enforcement of Antitrust Laws: 
The U.S. Model (Sept. 14, 2006) (remarks before the Fordham Competition Law Institute’s 
Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York, NY), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/218336.pdf; and Gary R. Spratling, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Transparency in 
Enforcement Maximizes Cooperation From Antitrust Offenders (Oct. 15, 1999) (presented at 
Fordham University School of Law, New York, NY), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/public/speeches/3952.pdf. 
42. Baker, supra note 4, at 406 n.6. 
43. Id. 
44. This is the case for any federal prosecutor contemplating criminal prosecution. 
The DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution state the government should proceed with 
prosecution where “the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and 
sustain a conviction.”  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, United States Attorneys’ Manual, § 9-
27.220. 
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as well in practice as in theory.  Second, the facts of the case, in light 
of recent developments in the application of the per se rule to both 
horizontal and vertical price fixing arrangements, raise significant 
legal questions about whether the per se rule is appropriate for the 
alleged collusion and what the relevant market for assessing 
competitive effects should be. 
Many strategic considerations likely influenced the decision as 
well, including the sufficiency of civil remedies, whether this case 
presents a truly novel question of fact or law, maintenance of public 
confidence in prosecutorial discretion, assessment of harm to 
consumers, Apple’s central role in the case, Amazon’s substantial 
market power in the market for e-books, and public perception of the 
defendants. 
A.  Criminal Antitrust Penalties and Deterrence 
The argument for imposing criminal penalties on individuals 
involved in antitrust violations is based in large part on deterrence.  
Standard deterrence theory assumes actors have knowledge of the 
law and potential consequences of transgression, and make rational 
self-interested choices, weighing the benefits of breaking the law with 
the likelihood of detection and the severity of the penalties they 
would face.45  To deter companies from engaging in cartel conduct 
like price fixing, then, an optimal fine should be greater than the gains 
of fixing prices, increased to compensate for imperfect enforcement.46  
Because detection of offenses like price fixing is difficult, and many 
transgressors will never be detected, optimal fines likely need to be 
increased to many times the amount of potential gain.47  But given the 
large profit motives involved, the results of such large fines might well 
lead the offending companies into bankruptcy.  Antitrust enforcers 
face what is known as the “deterrence trap”: deterrence-optimal fines 
would bring hardship on innocent employees and investors.48  
A solution to this problem is to penalize individual participation 
in cartels by imposing either civil or criminal sanctions, or both.  
 
45. More precisely, rational choice theories of deterrence. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, 
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
46. Peter Whelan, A Principled Argument for Personal Criminal Sanctions as 
Punishment under EC Cartel Law, 4 COMP. L. REV. 7 (2007). 
47. Wouter P.J. Wils, Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice, 29 WORLD 
COMPETITION 183, 194–195 (2006). 
48. See Christine Parker, The ‘‘Compliance Trap’’: The Moral Message in Responsive 
Regulatory Enforcement, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 591 (2006); John C Coffee Jr, “No Soul to 
Damn: No Body to Kick:”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate 
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981). 
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Because companies can mitigate fines by compensating employees, 
fines alone are a weak individual deterrent.49  Criminal penalties, 
especially incarceration, however, are less easily mitigated, and 
should provide stronger disincentive for individual participation in 
antitrust violations.50  In addition to the increased severity of criminal 
sanctions, people may fear the increased investigatory powers that 
accompany criminal prosecution, and infer more generally a greater 
financial and time commitment to enforcement of criminal offenses.51  
In fact, enhanced investigatory powers may provide the most potent 
deterrent effect in light of research showing people are much more 
responsive to increased likelihood of detection and enforcement than 
increased severity of punishment.52 
Over the past two decades, antitrust penalties have significantly 
strengthened.  However, there is significant evidence that despite 
drastic increases in corporate fines, individual fines, and individual 
jail terms, more and bigger cartels are being detected.53  Between the 
early 1990s and mid-2000s, average corporate fines have increased 
from $480,000 to $44,000,000 and €2,000,000 to €46,000,000, in the 
United States and European Union, respectively.54  Similarly, the 
average jail sentence imposed for antitrust violations in the United 
States more than doubled from 274 days in the early 1990s to 717 days 
in 2005-09.55  Also during this period, the United States and many 
other countries implemented corporate leniency programs, offering 
reduced penalties, and, for the first in the door, near immunity, in 
exchange for cooperation and whistle-blowing.56  Leniency programs 
 
49. Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels 
and Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 705 (2001). 
50. Donald Baker, a former head of the Antitrust Division, reports a very senior 
corporate executive telling him: “as long as you are only talking about money, the 
company can at the end of the day take care of me . . . but once you begin talking about 
taking away my liberty, there is nothing that the company can do for me.”  See id. 
51.  Caron Beaton-Wells & Christine Parker, Justifying Criminal Sanctions for Cartel 
Conduct: A Hard Case, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 198, 207 (2013). 
52. See, e.g., John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of 
Corporate Deterrence, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 7, 8–9 (1991). 
53. See John M. Connor & C. Gustav Helmers, Statistics on Modern Private 
International Cartels, 1990-2005 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 07-01, 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=944039; Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, 
Antitrust Sanctions, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3, 14–15 (2010). 
54. Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 53, at 4. 
55. Id. at 12–13, fig.6. 
56. Nathan H. Miller, Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 
750 (2009). 
56 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:1 
have likely increased cartel detection rates,57 and combined with 
drastically increased penalties, should have had the effect of better 
deterring and reducing antitrust behavior.  But the number of 
international cartels (typically the largest and most harmful to 
consumers) discovered per year increased from 4 to 6 per year in the 
early 1990s to 35 per year in the mid-2000s.58  It is possible that 
enforcement agencies are simply doing a better job detecting and 
prosecuting cartels, but it could just as well be the case that cartels are 
fixing prices more frequently despite the increased penalties.  
Evidence on recidivism suggests the latter is more likely, and that 
cartels are currently being under-deterred: The top ten recidivists 
between 1990 and 2009 have had an average of over 15 judgments, 
with the worst, BASF, had 26 judgments against in in that period.59  In 
the 15-year period 1990-2005, there were 86 companies with three or 
more judgments, and seven companies averaging one or more per 
year.60  
It is possible that enforcement has been too focused on corporate 
fines, and larger increases in individual penalties would better deter 
antitrust violations.61  And the fact that the majority of major cartels 
have been located outside the United States, where individual 
criminal penalties are strongest, suggests inconsistent criminal 
penalties worldwide may explain current cartel under deterrence.  
But several problems with criminal antitrust penalties have been 
identified, particularly behavioral biases that render such measures 
less effective than they appear in theory. 
Deterrence theory assumes that businesspeople can identify 
antitrust behavior and recognize it is a criminal offense, and also 
assumes that they can accurately estimate the likelihood they will be 
detected and successfully prosecuted.  It is not clear, however, that 
these are reasonable assumptions. Many cognitive biases have been 
shown to distort perceptions about the likelihood of detection and 
sanction, and these biases tend to be magnified when individuals 
attempt to estimate the risks they themselves face.62  Empirical 
 
57. Miller, supra note 56, at 760. 
58. Connor & Helmers, supra note 53, at 37–38. 
59. Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 53, at 15 fig.7. 
60. Connor & Helmers, supra note 53, at 23 tbl.E. 
61. See generally Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 53. 
62. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A 
Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004); John T. Scholz 
& Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship 
Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490 (1995). 
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evidence for the deterrence effect of criminal enforcement in the 
United States is limited.63  And recent evidence from surveys 
conducted during the implementation of criminal antitrust laws in 
Australia calls into question several basic assumptions about 
deterrence.64 
First, antitrust violations are complex, and businesspeople may 
not readily recognize behavior that amounts to criminal antitrust 
violations.  Analysis of the Australian surveys revealed that a 
majority of those surveyed were unable to identify criminal price 
fixing, and even where they had accurate knowledge of the law and 
available penalties, one-third still judged it likely that businesspeople 
would engage in conduct meriting criminal penalties.65  The United 
States has a long history of antitrust laws, and people may more 
readily recognize antitrust conduct than elsewhere.  Still, recognizing 
behavior that violates antitrust laws is bound to be more difficult 
than, for example, recognizing theft or assault.  This is likely to be 
even more so in cases involving complex arrangements like the e-
books agreements, where there is arguably no literal price fixing. 
Second, an individual’s perception about societal support for 
laws tends to be strongly correlated with estimation of the chances of 
detection and punishment, and compliance.66  That is, if a person 
thinks society condemns certain behavior and supports laws that 
punish such behavior, he is more likely to comply with the law, and 
consider the probability of detection and enforcement to be higher.  
Likewise if a person himself agrees with the law: in the Australian 
survey, this was the strongest predictor of perceived likelihood of 
detection and enforcement—more so than prior knowledge of cartel 
law and sanctions.67  
 
63. What empirical evidence there is, is weak. See, e.g., Christine Parker, Criminal 
Cartel Sanctions and Compliance: The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality, in CRIMINALISING 
CARTELS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT 239 
(Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., Hart Publ’g 2011); Maurice E. Stucke, Am I a 
Price Fixer? A Behavioural Economics Analysis of Cartels, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: 
CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT 263, 267–69 
(Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., Hart Publ’g 2011); Jesse W. Markham Jr., 
Does Criminalization of Cartels Work? A Few Lessons from the United States Experience, 3 
NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. 115 (2012). 
64. See Beaton-Wells & Parker, supra note 51. 
65. Id. at 210. 
66. See Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik Jr., Conscience, Significant Other, 
and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 837 (1990); 
Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, To What Extent Do Third Parties Influence 
Business Compliance?, 35 J. L. SOC’Y 309 (2008). 
67. Beaton-Wells & Parker, supra note 50, at 209–210. 
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Beliefs about the inherent criminality of antitrust violations are 
also relevant.  If “what distinguishes a criminal from a civil 
sanction . . . is the judgment of community condemnation which 
accompanies and justifies its imposition”68 and if the public does not 
see certain antitrust violations as meriting criminal punishment, there 
will naturally be lower public support of and agreement with the law.  
To the extent that this is true, it will affect individual perception of 
the likelihood of detection and prosecution, and by extension the 
efficacy of criminal penalties in deterring antitrust violations.69  In the 
Australian antitrust criminalization survey, the majority of 
respondents believed price fixing cartels should be illegal, but less 
than half believed they should be criminal, and less than 20% 
believed incarceration was appropriate punishment.70  In the United 
States, the backlash to the e-books lawsuit has demonstrated there is 
little (or, at least, inconsistent) public support for some antitrust laws.  
In particular, although ruinous competition has long since been 
rejected as a defense to antitrust violations,71 it seems the argument 
that collusion is necessary to combat monopoly is very appealing to 
the public.72 
The Antitrust Division has long maintained that individual 
criminal penalties are more effective than corporate fines,73 and this is 
among the principal reasons that the DOJ policy is to file criminal 
suits in cases of hardcore price fixing.  While there is insufficient 
empirical evidence to conclude this is an effective deterrent, and 
there are reasons to question whether criminal penalties function as 
well in practice as they do in theory, it is unlikely that the choice of 
 
68. Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
401, 404 (1958).  See also Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal 
Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 447 (1963). 
69. Others have argued criminal law leads rather than follows, public opinion.  See, 
e.g., Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the 
Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 217 (1964). 
70. Beaton-Wells & Parker, supra note 50, at 212. 
71. The Supreme Court first rejected this defense in United States v. Trans-Missouri 
Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).  The Court has consistently held that competition is 
presumptively beneficial, and that no defense may be raised on the “assumption that 
competition itself is unreasonable.”  Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 
679, 696 (1978). 
72. See, e.g., David Carr, Book Publishing’s Real Nemesis, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 16, 2012), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/business/media/amazon-low-prices-disguise-
a-high-cost.html?_r=0. 
73. John M. Connor, The United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s Cartel 
Enforcement: Appraisal and Proposals, 60, n.170 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 
08-02, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130204. 
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civil enforcement in this case reflects a broad change in attitudes 
within the Antitrust Division regarding the efficacy of criminal 
enforcement.  Longstanding policy and lack of clear indication 
otherwise also suggest there is no reason to think the DOJ is 
rethinking its general stance that criminal penalties are effective 
deterrents.  But the various potential problems with criminal 
punishments, combined with the facts of this case suggest, at the very 
least, that a more nuanced policy regarding criminal enforcement may 
be preferable, and that the DOJ may adopt a less categorical 
approach in the future.  
B.  Price Fixing, Modes of Analysis, and the E-Book Conspiracy 
1.  The Per Se Rule and Rule of Reason Analysis 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.”74  
Despite this literal (and very broad) wording, the Supreme Court has 
long interpreted the provision to prohibit only unreasonable 
restraints.75  The Act’s purpose is to safeguard competition,76 and in 
examining challenged actions, courts must “form a judgment about 
the competitive significance of the restraint.”77  Conduct that raises 
prices or reduces output restrains competition.78  To determine 
whether competition is unreasonably restrained, courts apply the rule 
of reason and analyze the restraint’s actual effects on competition in a 
relevant market.79  Certain categories of restraint, however, are 
presumed to unreasonably restrain competition: conduct that “always 
or almost always tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease output” 
is condemned per se illegal without further analysis.80  In such 
circumstances, therefore, a plaintiff need only prove that such an 
 
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
75. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60–68 (1911); Northwest Wholesale 
Stationers v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985) (“[E]very 
commercial agreement restrains trade. Whether this action violates §1 of the Sherman Act 
depends on whether it is adjudged an unreasonable restraint.”). 
76. In the words of Justice White, the purpose of the Sherman Act is not to protect 
“against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly 
tends to destroy competition itself.” Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 
(1993). 
77. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692. 
78. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 
85, 113 (1984). 
79. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 688. 
80. Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 U.S. at 886 (quoting Business Electronics 
Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).  
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agreement exists.  Only after extensive experience with certain 
business relationships will courts be satisfied this is the case and 
classify them as per se illegal,81 and horizontal price fixing is among 
the few practices courts are comfortable condemning outright.82 
Over time, however, the Supreme Court has taken an 
increasingly nuanced approach to horizontal price fixing.  Because 
application of the per se rule is appropriate only where restraints 
undoubtedly will impede competition, cases in which there was not 
clear and unambiguous horizontal price fixing have prompted the 
Court to err on the side of caution and delve deeper before 
condemning the challenged arrangements.83  Because in complex 
modern markets, arrangements that have the effect of fixing prices 
may not necessarily result in net anticompetitive effects, what was 
once a very robust rule has been pared back and now seems 
appropriate only where literal price fixing can be readily identified.84  
Otherwise, courts must first look at the effects and purpose behind a 
practice and determine whether it will “threaten the proper operation 
of a predominantly free-market economy.”85 
2.  Recent Developments in Horizontal and Vertical Price Fixing 
While the Complaint alleges per se violation, in reality the 
Division may question whether the sort of conduct at issue in the e-
books case necessarily merits per se illegality.  First, the Court’s 
recent decision in Leegin removed vertical price fixing (in the form of 
minimum retail price maintenance) from the ambit of the per se rule. 
Because the challenged arrangement in this case is a series of similar 
vertical restraints, it too may be better suited to rule of reason 
analysis.  The Supreme Court has also added significant wrinkles to 
its horizontal price fixing doctrine, and several parallels with two 
 
81. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972). 
82. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). Per se 
illegality stems from the fundamental economic assumption that competitive markets will 
correctly price goods to achieve allocative efficiency and maximum social utility.  
83. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. 679 (adopting rule of reason in 
assessing legality of horizontal restraint involving professional code of ethics); Broadcast 
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding rule of reason 
appropriate in examining commercial blanket licensing arrangement, even though a price 
fixing agreement was “literally” at issue); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. 85 
(rejecting per se analysis despite finding horizontal price and output restrictions). 
84. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust 
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1226–28 (2008). 
85. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 19. 
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recent cases suggest the per se rule may be inappropriate for the 
challenged conduct here.  
Initially, the Court did not distinguish between vertical (supplier-
retailer) and horizontal (supplier-supplier, retailer-retailer, etc.) price 
fixing arrangements: both were per se illegal.86  A series of decisions,87 
culminating in Leegin, created a distinction between horizontal and 
vertical restraints: the former remaining subject to the per se rule, and 
the latter evaluated under the rule of reason.88  Like other 
anticompetitive conduct evaluated under the rule of reason, vertical 
restraints may thus be justified by pro-competitive effects.89 
Horizontal price fixing doctrine has likewise seen change in 
recent years.  In the 1980s, Sony and Phillips coordinated to charge 
license fees for the use of the CD technology in an effort to introduce 
CDs as an alternative to tape media.90  This coordinated imposition of 
license fees obviously resulted in a markup over competitive prices, 
but the Federal Circuit found it justified by the fact that the fees were 
necessary to recoup sunk investments in technology.91  If such 
coordination was disallowed, the new technology would never have 
made it to market.92 
The Supreme Court followed similar logic in Broadcast Music, 
Inc. v. CBS and declined to apply the per se rule to a system of 
blanket license fees negotiated by competitors, even though the 
coordination had the effect of fixing prices.93  The motivation was to 
create a new product: a blanket license to TV stations for copyrighted 
musical works.94  Because of the transaction costs involved in licensing 
 
86. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
87. Vertical non-price restraints were deemed subject to rule of reason analysis in 
Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) and State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 
U.S. 3 (1997) did the same for maximum retail price maintenance. 
88. Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 U.S. at 877. 
89. Id. 
90. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
91. Id. at 1322–23. 
92. Herbert Hovenkamp, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 251 (3d ed. 2005).  See generally Robert S. Pindyck, 
Sunk Costs and Real Options in Antitrust Analysis, 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND 
POLICY 619 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008) (concluding the danger of sinking 
capital into development of new technologies only to be preempted by a competitor’s 
standard can induce firms to wait, which in the aggregate can result in market failure). 
93. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23.  The Court noted its doubt that the practice 
threatened the “central nervous system of the economy,” and concluded the more 
discriminating examination of the rule of reason was appropriate.  Id. at 24 (quoting 
Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 226 n.59). 
94. Id. at 4. 
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copyrights from thousands of rights-holders, TV stations were unable 
to efficiently license music for broadcast.  Coordination between the 
rights-holders in aggregating their copyrights and determining a fixed 
licensing fee was necessary to bring a new product to market.95 
In Texaco Inc. v. Dagher the Court again narrowed the scope of 
the per se rule.96  Texaco and Shell had formed a joint venture to 
jointly refine gasoline, and agreed upon a price at which to sell it 
under their respective brand names.97  The Court, in declining to 
apply the per se rule, reasoned that  joint ventures, which are legally 
single entities, must, “like any other firm, . . . have the discretion to 
determine the prices of the products that it sells, including the 
discretion to sell a product under two different brands at a single, 
unified price.”98  The Court quoted Broadcast Music for the 
proposition that “joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements 
are also not usually unlawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes, 
where the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at 
all.”99  Unlike in Broadcast Music, however, Texaco and Shell had not 
really introduced a new product. Rather, they jointly produced an 
existing product and sold it under their different brands. 
3.  The E-Books Agreement 
The specifics of the e-books case, in conjunction with the 
Supreme Court’s recent price fixing jurisprudence, provide Apple and 
the publishers with several strong arguments that their conduct 
should not be considered per se illegal.  
First, the publishers may argue their conduct was necessary to 
prevent free riding and protect sunk investments, emphasizing the 
vertical restraints, not the horizontal collusion required to put them in 
place.  Consumers can free ride by browsing Apple’s bookstore (or 
physical bookstores, if the relevant market includes all books), which 
arguably provides a better experience, only to take advantage of 
Amazon’s discounted prices.  In Leegin, the Supreme Court held 
minimum retail price maintenance to be justified along these lines,100 
and there is considerable evidence that, in practice, such vertical price 
 
95. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23. 
96. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006). 
97. Id. at 3. 
98. Id. at 7. 
99. Id. at 8 (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 23). 
 100. Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 U.S. at 913–14. 
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fixing (and, for example, by MFN clauses) makes consumers better 
off.101 
Second, the Broadcast Music and Dagher decisions strongly 
suggest that in cases where cooperation is either required to introduce 
a new product, or perhaps simply if conducted under the guise of a 
joint venture, resultant horizontal price fixing should be evaluated 
under the rule of reason.  On the facts alleged in the Complaint, the 
case against the publishers appears strong, and the Division may have 
been able to bring and win a criminal per se case against them.  
Including Apple, however, changes the picture.  Apple will certainly 
argue that absent insulation from price competition with Amazon, it 
would not have entered the market at all, and can very plausibly 
claim significant benefit to consumers by its entry, which resulted in 
greater diversity of offerings, and several beneficial innovations 
(color, pictures, video, etc.).102  To a certain extent, the Apple 
marketplace for e-books amounts to a new product, and one which 
may have required coordination to bring to market.  Moreover, 
market changes engineered by Apple and the publishers have 
undeniably coincided with increased, rather than depressed, output.103  
And the fact that prices and output have risen simultaneously also 
strengthens Apple’s arguments about the pro-competitive effects of 
the agency model and its entrance into the e-book market.  All these 
factors indicate a situation where, as in Broadcast Music, the pro-
competitive benefits of some measure of collusion and horizontal 
restraint outweigh the anticompetitive effects. 
Third, the Apple Agency Agreements may not literally restrain 
pricing of e-books.  Because e-books are distributed by license, the 
publishers are free to set retail prices, regardless of which model is 
adopted.104  Before Apple’s entry into the market and the shift to 
agency distribution, the publishers had but one real option for selling 
e-books: Amazon.  Because of this monopsony, no publisher could 
individually exercise its pricing power and impose minimum retail 
 
 101. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: 
Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 391–414 
(Paolo Buccirossi ed., MIT Press 2008) (reviewing empirical research on RPM and finding 
broad consensus that it most often results in consumer benefit, including higher quality 
products and better services.), available at http://www.economics.ubc. ca/files/2013/05/ 
pdf_paper_margaret-slade-exclusivecontracts-verticalrestraints.pdf. 
 102. Answer, United States v. Apple, et al., 12-CV-2826, 2012 WL 1862008, at ¶ 1 
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2012) [hereinafter Answer]. 
 103. Answer at ¶ 93. This flies in the face of basic economic theory, which suggests a 
downward sloping demand curve, whereby higher prices correspond with less demand. 
 104.  Hovenkamp, et al., supra note 18. 
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prices.  Apple’s entry provided the publishers’ opportunity to adopt a 
distribution model Amazon otherwise would have blocked.  They will 
argue that, in effect, their power to set prices is unchanged under the 
agency model. All that really changes is Amazon’s veto on retail 
pricing, a power to which it is not legally entitled.  
These arguments may have been sufficient to convince the DOJ 
that the agreements between the publishers and Apple do not quite 
reach the level of traditional, hardcore per se illegal horizontal price 
fixing.  This may be why the Complaint appears to allege both per se 
and rule of reason cases.  On the one hand, the Complaint alleges an 
“understanding and concert of action” among the publishers and 
Apple to “raise, fix, and stabilize retail e-book prices, end price 
competition among e-book retailers, and to limit retail price 
competition among” the publishers.105  On the other, it contains 
lengthy exposition of anticompetitive effects—the sort of arguments 
necessary to bring a rule of reason case.  Thus while the Complaint 
does allege a horizontal price fixing conspiracy, this may simply be 
posturing.  Perhaps actions speak louder than words: after all, the 
DOJ filed a civil suit, not a criminal one. 
4.  Relevant Market 
Also questionable is the proposed definition of the relevant 
market, which would be critical if the case were analyzed under the 
rule of reason.  The relevant market is critical in rule of reason cases 
because it is key to determining defendant market power and 
potential anticompetitive effects of a restraint.106  Although the 
Supreme Court’s famous footnote 59 in Socony-Vacuum explained 
that market power is not a precondition to application of the per se 
rule,107 subsequent decisions have demonstrated the Court is in fact 
willing to consider the participants’ market positions in determining 
per se illegality.108  If a court were to look at the relevant market in 
examining anticompetitive effects of the alleged conspiracy, the 
proposed definition might prove a weak point in the government’s 
case.  
The government proposes a narrow definition limited to trade e-
books, excluding print.109  It presents several strong arguments for this 
 
 105. Complaint at ¶ 95. 
 106.  See United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1956). 
 107. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 226 n.59. 
 108. See cases cited supra note 83. 
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position, noting several advantages of e-books and differences 
between them.  And it concludes e-books have no good substitutes.110  
Whether or not this is the case, elsewhere the Complaint convincingly 
tells the story of beleaguered publishers inspired to collusion by their 
concerns about the adverse impact of Amazon’s e-book discounting 
on print books.111  The complaint specifically alleges that the 
publishers were gravely concerned about the large price differential 
between print and electronic versions and that expectations of lower 
prices would spill over to print.112  This would negate the “competitive 
advantages they held as a result of years of investments in their print 
book business.”113  
Thus despite the Division’s arguments to the contrary, its own 
Complaint evidences the fact that many consumers do consider e-
books substitutes for print books.  After all, electronic and print 
books contain generally the same content, are written by the same 
authors, and are funded by the same investments of the publishers.  If 
the competitive threat to print books was enough to motivate the 
publishers to engineer an elaborate scheme to change the industry 
distribution model, the converse is likely true as well: print books are 
a competitive threat to e-books.  If this is so, then the relevant market 
may well include all books.  In which case the government will face a 
tougher task should it be required to prove anticompetitive effects.  If 
the government had brought a criminal case rather than civil, that 
task would have been tougher still. 
C.  Strategic Considerations 
The Division is usually not fortunate enough to have a open-and-
shut case, and price fixing cases are often brought based on 
circumstantial evidence.  And there is always risk involved in bringing 
charges before a jury.  Thus if the legal issues discussed above were 
insufficient on their own to have ruled out a criminal case, several 
strategic considerations weighing in favor of a civil action may have 
tipped the balance. 
1.  Civil Injunction 
The availability of a civil injunction provides the government a 
powerful tool to restore the pre-Apple status quo.  If the principal 
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goal of the Division in bringing the case was to return prices to 
previous levels rather than punish the defendants or provide an 
example for deterrence purposes, then the Division may have 
weighed the risks of bringing the case against the sufficiency of a civil 
remedy and found a criminal case unattractive.  Also, the DOJ’s 
Principles of Federal Prosecution state that where a criminal 
prosecution would otherwise be called for, it may be unnecessary if 
“there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.”114  
As of early 2013, Apple is the only remaining defendant, with the 
publishers all having settled with the DOJ.115  The settlements entered 
between the United States and publishers mandate termination of the 
Agency Agreements, a return to the wholesale model, and restitution 
to purchasers of e-books.116  That all the settlements contain this 
restitutionary remedy lends support to the view that the DOJ’s 
overriding concern was a return to the status quo. 
2.  Novel Issues of Fact or Law 
Antitrust Division standards for determining whether to bring 
criminal charges contain a discretionary exception for “truly novel 
issues of fact or law.”117  It is possible the Division found the particular 
arrangement between Apple and the publishers falls into this 
exception.  The government has criminally prosecuted arrangements 
involving series of vertical restraints before, and the courts has found 
them per se illegal.118  But these both involved a group of competitors 
at the supplier level colluding with a retailer possessing substantial 
market power.  The publishers, by contrast, colluded with Apple, 
who, although a powerful company with significant power in other 
markets, had yet to enter the market for e-books.  With that said, the 
Division is generally not shy about bringing criminal charges where 
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the collusion does not correspond perfectly with previous examples.119  
In light of this, it appears unlikely this particular arrangement 
presents a sufficiently novel issue of law that would foreclose criminal 
prosecution.  
Perhaps more importantly, cases for which the application of the 
per se rule is not entirely clear tend to be brought anyway because 
they involve blatant anticompetitive conduct and effects.120  Two 
factors may distinguish the e-books case: the anticompetitive effects 
here are not entirely self-evident, and the defendants have several 
potential pro-competitive arguments to offer in defense of the new 
model.  Regardless, if this was a principal reason for bringing a civil 
rather than criminal case, the Division would likely have made that 
clear.  Doing so would prevent uncertainty about whether policies are 
in flux. In light of its silence, it is hard to imagine this exception was a 
key factor in deciding to forego criminal prosecution, though in 
conjunction with other considerations, the relative novelty of the facts 
may have played a part. 
3.  Prosecutorial Discretion 
Concern about public perception of antitrust enforcement, and 
federal prosecution in general, may also have weighed against a 
criminal case.  The Sherman Act’s bipolarity—both criminal and civil 
penalties flow from the same words—vests a great deal of 
prosecutorial discretion with the DOJ.  The choice between seeking 
civil or criminal redress on behalf of the public for antitrust violations 
is a serious responsibility and getting it wrong will have serious 
consequences.  Inappropriately bringing criminal cases carries the risk 
of appearing to the public an erratic or arbitrary enforcer, perhaps 
motivated more by political factors, back-room dealing, or favoritism 
than strict adherence to application of the antitrust laws. 
And yet a steady hand is needed on the wheel of antitrust, and 
the Division, like any other public prosecutor, should seek to apply 
laws consistently.  Clear enforcement policies establish predictable 
boundaries between civil and criminal conduct.  To this end the 
government regularly prosecutes specific categories of 
anticompetitive conduct criminally, and others civilly.  Horizontal 
price fixing and market allocation nearly always give rise to criminal 
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charges, and others, including tie-ins, merger cases, and restrictive 
membership rules, result in civil cases.121 
So there may be tension between, on the one hand, consistency 
in prosecuting cases, and on the other, public perception of impartial 
and even-handed enforcement.  In this case, the Division may have 
concluded bringing a criminal case against defendants for violations 
widely perceived to be worthy of civil penalties would expose the 
government to criticism of abuse of its prosecutorial discretion.  The 
attendant impact on public confidence in the government’s antitrust 
enforcement might well defeat whatever positive impact (deterrence, 
retribution, or public confidence) stemmed from the criminal case. 
4.  Sympathetic Narratives and The Case Against Apple 
Whether criminal or civil, Amazon would inevitably loom over 
the case.  Backlash against the case indicates the public views 
Amazon as a monopolist, and there appears to be genuine 
appreciation for increased diversity of e-book offerings.122  Regardless 
of their merits, the Division is undoubtedly aware of these feelings.  
And the government is equally aware that at trial the defendants 
would paint themselves as struggling to cast off the traditions of print, 
the dominant paradigm for centuries and embrace the nascent world 
of e-books, a transition made all the more difficult by Amazon’s 
machinations.  
A criminal case against Apple would also be more difficult to 
win.123  Not only is the legal case against Apple weaker, Apple would 
have a compelling narrative to tell a jury.  The government would 
have to overcome a perception of an Amazon-monopolized industry 
to which Apple, a hugely popular company, widely esteemed for its 
innovation and forward-looking nature, attempted to introduce a bit 
of its magic.  And despite the added difficulty of doing so, the 
government was probably unwilling to bring the case without naming 
Apple, the hub of the conspiracy. 
D.  Putting It All Together: An Explanation for an Odd Lawsuit 
1.  Some Horizontal Price Fixing is Not Per Se Illegal  
It is possible the Division believes the sort of conduct engaged in 
by the defendants should not be considered illegal per se.  They may 
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have read the tea leaves in Broadcast Music and Dagher, which 
suggested evolving attitudes toward horizontal restraints.  The nature 
of competition in high-tech industries may also demand a more 
nuanced view of collusion.   If so, the DOJ may treat differently 
collusive conduct that falls short of naked horizontal price fixing 
motivated solely by a desire to extract consumer surplus.  The DOJ 
may be headed toward a policy where some horizontal price fixing is 
not illegal per se, and does not call for criminal prosecution.  The 
allegation of a per se violation in the Complaint contradicts this view, 
but the Division may simply be hedging its bets, or this may reflect an 
unwillingness to surrender that bargaining chip so early in the game.  
It does seem unlikely, however, that the DOJ would unilaterally 
determine certain conduct should no longer be considered per se 
illegal, and unlikelier still that they would make prosecution decisions 
on the basis of such a determination.  Antitrust laws may well end up 
with a more nuanced approach to horizontal restraints, much like 
vertical restraints, but the DOJ will probably wait for the Supreme 
Court to make that decision first. 
2.  Not All Horizontal Price Fixing is Equal (or Treated Equally) 
On the other hand, if we take the complaint at its word, that the 
DOJ considers the collusion between Apple and the publishers illegal 
per se, it is possible the DOJ is in the midst of a major change in 
policy. 
One possibility is that the DOJ may be changing its policy about 
criminal prosecution of horizontal price fixing cases.  It may believe 
certain per se price fixing violations do not merit criminal 
consequences—a “softcore” category of per se illegal price fixing.  
Another is that the e-books case may be an example of an 
intermediate category of cases the Division believes are provable by a 
preponderance of the evidence but not beyond a reasonable doubt.  It 
is possible the government is simply not willing to give up so easily in 
cases where they encounter burden of proof problems.  Both of these 
possibilities, however, amount to sweeping policy changes.  Either 
changing the scope of criminal conduct under the Act, or adopting 
Division prosecution policy that is inconsistent with general DOJ 
policy, especially without formal notice, seems shortsighted.  
Transparency in enforcement is one of the Division’s top priorities, 
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and this sort of shift would very likely merit announcement to the 
public.124  
3.  Simply an Outlier? 
Finally, the decision could simply be an outlier. It is conceivable 
that the decision was made based on political, rather than doctrinal, 
reasons.  Because this would seemingly be a major violation of the 
government’s prosecutorial discretion, this seems exceedingly 
unlikely.  It is more probable the DOJ judged the benefits of a 
nonadherence in this case to outweigh the costs of departing from 
strict adherence.  If this is so, there are several prudential reasons that 
likely would have weighed in favor of a one-time exception.  
First, the DOJ has an interest in maintaining public confidence in 
antitrust enforcement.  On the one hand, possible adverse 
consequences might include weaker antitrust deterrence (or not, 
depending on the deterrence efficacy of criminal sanctions) and 
increased uncertainty about the scope of criminal conduct under the 
Sherman Act.  Such uncertainty can result in deadweight losses as 
companies make decisions based on incomplete information about 
the legality of their actions.   And such costs are likely to be 
exaggerated in fast moving, high-tech sectors like e-books.   On the 
other, given public perception of Apple and the publishers as battling 
the monopolistic Amazon, a departure from form might be the better 
choice—especially so if sufficient civil remedies were available, as 
seems to be the case.  
Second, the decision may reflect prudential considerations about 
the dangers of over enforcement and over deterrence in high-tech 
industries.  These risks are greatest in high tech sectors, like e-books, 
where market forces are least predictable to enforcement agencies, 
and high rates of innovation lead to rapid changes in market 
structure.   The costs of misidentifying anticompetitive conduct are 
potentially very great: many high-tech innovators face 
multidimensional competition, and high-tech markets are more likely 
winner-take-all.   Thus there is good reason to proceed cautiously in 
the area, and combined with the various strategic and legal 
considerations that weighed against criminal enforcement, it seems 
most likely the DOJ made an individualized decision to bring a 
unique enforcement action.125 
 
 124. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust 
Law, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581 (2009); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, 
Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 153 (2010). 
 125. Spratling, supra note 41. 
Winter 2014]                 THE E-BOOKS PRICE FIXING LITIGATION 71 
   IV.  Conclusion 
Unless the DOJ decides to publicly reveal the details of its 
decision making process, it will never be completely clear what 
exactly motivated the DOJ to bring a civil case against Apple and the 
publishers.  Concerns about public perception of antitrust 
enforcement, concerns about over deterrence and chilling effects in 
high-tech industries, the deterrence efficacy of criminal sanctions, and 
the availability of civil injunctions seem the likeliest explanations.  
But it remains to be seen whether the decision will prove a one-time 
exception (and possibly go unexplained), or a harbinger of long-term 
changes in antitrust policy.  
Regardless of whether the case proves to be an outlier and what 
the specific reasons were for choosing to bring a civil case, the 
Division needs to maintain transparency about its antitrust 
enforcement policies—especially those concerning the choice of 
whether to pursue civil or criminal sanctions.  Not only is 
transparency in decision-making key to maintaining public trust in 
law enforcement, it is also central to antitrust deterrence: generally, in 
providing clear guidelines about what conduct is legal and what is 
proscribed; and more specifically in encouraging cooperation from 
antitrust offenders.  Transparency leads to predictability, and the 
Division’s leniency program depends on transparency in prosecution 
standards.  If prospective cooperating parties cannot predict the 
likelihood of prosecution, or cannot be certain of their treatment 
following cooperation, they will not come forward. 
Finally, there are good reasons to speculate the decision to bring 
a civil case against Apple and the publishers was motivated by 
positive changes in how the DOJ views the high-tech industry, as well 
as the need for a more flexible approach toward complicated 
arrangements in emerging markets.  It would be a good thing if this 
case reflected a general shift in that direction.  And simply explaining 
why exactly it was that no criminal case was brought against Apple 
and the publishers would be a step in that direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
